A number of studies have examined the perception of time with durations ranging from milliseconds to a few seconds, however the neural basis of these processes are still poorly understood and the neural substrates underlying the perception of multiple-second intervals are unknown. Here we present evidence of neural systems activity in circumscribed areas of the human brain involved in the encoding of intervals with durations of 9 and 18 s in a temporal reproduction task using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). During the encoding there was greater activation in more posterior parts of the medial frontal and insular cortex whereas the reproduction phase involved more anterior parts of these brain structures. Intriguingly, activation curves over time show an accumulating pattern of neural activity, which peaks at the end of the interval within bilateral posterior insula and superior temporal cortex when individuals are presented with 9-and 18-s tone intervals. This is consistent with an accumulator-type activity, which encodes duration in the multiple seconds range. Given the close connection between the dorsal posterior insula and ascending internal body signals, we suggest that the accumulation of physiological changes in body states constitutes our experience of time. This is the first time that an accumulation function in the posterior insula is detected that might be correlated with the encoding of time intervals.
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Introduction
The experience of time is fundamental for perception and behavior and, thus, essential for the survival of the organism (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Wittmann & Paulus, 2008) . Although studies have pointed to several brain areas involved in the processing of duration, to date conclusive answers to the questions of which areas of the brain and what kind of neurophysiological processes account for the experience of time in humans have remained elusive (Wittmann, 2009) . Over the past decade, a number of different brain areas have been implicated as key parts of the neural timekeeping mechanism in the milliseconds to a few seconds time range: notably, the cerebellum (Gooch, Wiener, Wencil, & Coslett, 2010; Ivry & Spencer, 2004) , the right posterior parietal cortex (Bueti, Bahrami, & Walsh, 2008) , the right prefrontal cortex (Lewis & Miall, 2003a; Smith, Taylor, Lidzba, & Rubia, 2003) , a right frontoparietal network (Harrington, Haaland, & Knight, 1998; Rao, Mayer, & Harrington, 2001) , and fronto (SMA)-striatal circuits (Hinton & Meck, 2004; Jech, Dusek, Wackermann, & Vymazal, 2005; Koch, Brusa, Oliveri, Stanzione, & Caltagirone, 2005; Koch et al., 2008) . The involvement of many brain areas in the processing of time is most likely due to the involvement of cognitive processes that are not necessarily related to the encoding of duration, e.g. attention, working memory and decision-making (Livesey, Wall, & Smith, 2007; Rao et al., 2001) . Moreover, different processing stages directly linked to the estimation of time may come into play (Morillon, Kell, & Giraud, 2009 ). In addition, this list is expansive as it includes studies on numerous time intervals, which recruit different brain areas. Several studies and meta-analyses have indicated that, for instance, millisecond timing is governed by different processes than time perception in the seconds or multiple seconds range ( Lewis & Miall, 2003a; Pöppel, 1997 Pöppel, , 2009 Wiener, Turkeltaub, & Coslett, 2010; Wittmann et al., 2007) .
There is also a lack of consensus as to what mechanisms account for our sense of time. The most prominent cognitive models for the time range of milliseconds to seconds have been variants of a pacemaker-accumulator clock where an oscillator produces
